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VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
TOTH V. QUARLES - FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE?
WILLIAM R. WILLIS, JR.*
THE BACKGROUND
On Monday, March 7th, 1949, a subcommittee of the House Armed
Services Committee opened public hearings on the proposed Uniform
Code of Military Justice. Present, among others, was Professor
Edmund M. Morgan, Chairman of the Committee appointed by the
Secretary of Defense to draft a Uniform Code of Justice for the
Armed Forces.
During a portion of Professor Morgan's testimony before the com-
mittee, the following discussion took place:
Mr. Elston: ... I think it was since you completed your hearings that
a case has been decided by the Supreme Court of the United States.
Dr. Morgan: The Hirschberg case?l
Mr. Elston: Yes. To the effect that a person who has left the service,
that is, who has been separated from the service, cannot be tried subse-
quently by a military court for an offense committed prior to such separa-
tion.
Dr. Morgan: That is right.
Mr. Elston: Now, you have not anything in your bill covering that? ....
He may have even committed a murder within three days of his separation
from service.
Dr. Morgan: That is right. We have not covered that.
Mr. Elston: He re-enlists and cannot be tried for it.
Dr. Morgan: That is right.
Mr. Elston: I think this committee can write something into the law
that will take care of that ridiculous situation.
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In accordance with this expressed intent the committee recom-
mended, that the Congress include in the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, a provision which stated:
[A~ny person charged with having committed, while in a status in which
he was subject to this Chapter an offense against this Chapter, punishable
by confinement of five years or more and for which the person cannot
be tried in the courts of the United States or any State or Territory thereof
or of the District of Columbia, shall not be relieved from amenability
to trial by courts-martial by reason of the termination of said status. 3
*First Lieutenant, JAGC. Assistant Staff Judge Advocate, and Chief, Mili-
tary Justice, Headquarters, I Corps (Group), Korea; Member, Tennessee
Bar. This article reflects the personal opinion of the author and does not
necessarily express the views of the Office of the Judge Advocate General of
the Army nor of any other government instrumentality.
1. United States ex rel. Hirshberg v. Cooke, 336 U.S. 210 (1949). Hirschberg
was charged with a crime that was committed during his prior enlistment. The
court held that the expiration of his term of enlistment and reenlistment
before trial had deprived the military or jurisdiction to punish the crime.
2. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the Uniform Code of Military
Justice of the House Committee on Armed Services, H.R. 2498, 81st Cong., 1st.
Sess.. No. 37, at 565, 617 (1949).
3. Uniform Code of Military Justice, article 3(a), 64 STAT. 109 (1950)




In November 1955 the constitutionality of this provision was
squarely presented to the Supreme Court of the United States in the
much publicized case of Toth v. Quarles.4 Toth, a former enlisted
member of the United States Air Force, was charged with murder. It
was alleged that he and a fellow airman apprehended a Korean
national while on guard duty at an air base in Korea. They took the
Korean before an Air Force officer who told them to take the captive
to a secluded spot and kill him. They promptly obeyed the order. Sub-
sequently, Toth returned to the United States and was given an hon-
orable discharge. The alleged crime was later detected and Toth, now
a civilian employee of a steel mill, was returned to Korea for trial
by court-martial. His sister presented a petition of habeas corpus
to the federal district court in Washington, D.C., where Toth had
been taken by direction of the Secretary of the Air Force prior to his
removal to Korea. The court ordered his release, 5 the court of appeals
reversed,6 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Supreme Court of the United States, with Mr. Justice Black
speaking for the majority, held that the constitutional provision
authorizing Congress to make rules and regulations for the government
of the land and naval forces (the constitutional basis for the Uniform
Code) could not be construed to allow such action on the part of the
Armed Forces. Such a construction would conflict with article III
and portions of the bill of rights. A perusal of history to ascertain
the intent of the constitutional framers indicated that the personal
rights and safeguards found in the bill of rights and article III must
prevail.
The Court pointed out that a civilian is assured certain definite
rights under the Constitution which are not guaranteed by the Uni-
form Code of Military Justice, the primary one being right to trial
by jury. Hence, to allow a civilian to be tried by court-martial would
be depriving him of these constitutional guarantees.
A careful, realistic comparison of rights guaranteed by both docu-
ments might render the constitutional reasons offered by the Court
less compelling.7 Further, such a comparison might reveal that a
military defendant is surrounded by more safeguards and has more
4. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955). During the
litigation of the case, Mr. Talbott was replaced by Mr. Quarles as Secretary
of the Air Force. However, the case is still commonly known as Toth v.
Talbott.
5. Toth v. Talbott, 114 F. Supp. 468 (D.D.C. 1953).
6. Talbott v. United States ex rel. Toth, 215 F.2d 22 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
7. See Wurfel, Military Due Process: What is It?, 6 VAND. L. REV. 251 (1953).
See United States v. Clay, 1 C.M.R. 74 (1951), in which the Court of Military




assurance of a fair trial than his civilian brother.8 However, such an
analysis would not contribute to the solution of the problem that the
decision clearly creates.
THE PROBLEM
What is the practical effect of the Supreme Court ruling? The ap-
plication of the decision is of little significance for the punishment
of crimes committed by subsequently discharged military personnel
in the continental United States. Such offenders could be punished
either in state or federal courts, provided the crime is not one of a
purely military nature, such as absence without leave or misconduct
as a sentinel.9
For all areas within the "special maritime and territorial" juris-
diction of the United States 0 (and the most liberal definition of these
terms would not include all the sectors of the world containing Ameri-
can military personnel), the decision is of little significance, provided
again, that the crimes are not ones of a purely military nature.
Further, the decision will be of little significance in foreign countries
containing American troops where the United States, by treaty or
agreement, has placed military personnel under the foreign govern-
ment for the exercise of concurrent criminal jurisdiction." Frequently
publicized examples of such nations are member countries of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Japan. This is provided, once
again, the crimes committed in these countries are not of a purely
military nature.
There are areas in which the decision will have application. First
of all, the full impact and significance of the ruling will be most
keenly felt in that unfortunate country giving rise to the Toth case-
the Republic of Korea.
By the Taejon agreement of 1950,12 the Korean government conceded
exclusive criminal jurisdiction over members of the United States
military establishment to the military authorities, and as of this
8. For example: the military accused is furnished legally trained counsel
at all stages of the prosecution in offense of a serious nature; is entitled to
a verbatim copy of the record of trial; generally knows all of the evidence
to be presented against him prior to the trial; and has mandatory review of
his conviction by an impartial body far removed from the scene of the offense
and trial. Further, the decisions abound with instances where convictions
have been reversed for the slightest indication of improper influence.
9. Crimes of this nature are not found in the civilian penal codes.
10. Most criminal offenses listed in Title 18, United States Code, are limited
to the United States, and its "special maritime and territorial jurisdiction."
11. North Atlantic Treaty, June 19, 1951, T.I.A.S. No. 2846; Administrative
Agreement With Japan, Feb. 28, 1952, 3 U.S. TREATiES & OTHER INT'L AGREE-
MENTS 3341, T.I.A.S. No. 2492.
12. Agreement between the American Ambassador to the Republic of
Korea and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea, executed at
Taejon, Korea, July 12, 1950.
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writing, the United States and Korea have not entered into an agree-
ment similar to that with the NATO countries. In addition, the crim-
inal jurisdiction of the courts of the United States is limited to the
United States and its "special maritime and territorial" jurisdiction.
Therefore, the decision creates an anomalous situation-not original
but infrequent. It presents the deplorable condition of detected, pro-
vable, legally recognizable crime committed by United States citizens
that cannot be punished. The crime alleged in the Toth case is an
inglorious example of this conclusion. In view of the jurisdictional
limitations imposed on federal courts and in deference to the Taejon
agreement, the United States military establishment was the only
governmental authority with jurisdiction to bring airmen-civilian
Toth to trial. The Supreme Court decision has denied the military
this jurisdictional power, and the crime will remain unpunished.
The full significance of the decision in Korea, with its thousands of
American military personnel, is best illustrated by the fact that military
police investigators and judge advocates preparing for trial often dis-
cover brazen, profitable crimes committed by military personnel who
have returned to the United States and have been subsequently dis-
charged. It is common conversation among military law enforcers
that former privates in Korea are now quite wealthy civilians in the
United States. Unless remedial action is immediately forthcoming,
the condition created by the absence of a valid statute granting juris-
diction will seriously hamper proper law enforcement in this area.
It hardly needs adding that the Supreme Court decision creates a
"vacuum" of this nature in any foreign country containing United
States military personnel with which the United States has not exe-
cuted a status-of-forces agreement.
Secondly, the full impact of the decision will be felt on that portion
of the military criminal law that defines and punishes certain offenses
that are historically and inherently military in nature, such as, absence
without leave, disobedience of orders, misconduct as a sentinel and
the other offenses defined in articles 84-115, 133 and 134 of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice. The most cursory glance at these offenses
indicates their overwhelming importance to the maintenance of proper
discipline in the armed forces. The federal code, criminal laws of the
various states and criminal codes of the foreign nations with whom
the United States has status-of-forces agreements, do not punish such
offenses in civil courts in view of their peculiarity to the military.
Consequently, military personnel, who commit undiscovered crimes
of this nature, either within or without the continental United States,
and who are discharged before apprehension, are free from any threat
of punishment.. Mr. Justice Black to the contrary, the potential impact
of this situation upon discipline, the foundation of any effective mili-




There are three possible methods which could be considered in at-
tempting to eliminate the "vacuum" created by the decision. However,
each possibility has definite disadvantages.
First, and worthy of the closest scrutiny, is the suggestion by the
Supreme Court in the Toth opinion that Congress, by appropriate
legislation, could make such offenses and offenders triable in federal
courts.
It is generally agreed among writers and commentators that the
right to exercise jurisdiction over subjects who have committed of-
fenses in a foreign country is an essential attribute of sovereignty,
and Mr. Wheaton, a purported authority on international law, has gone
so far as to say that this principle is peculiar to the jurisprudence of
England and the United States.13 However, a perusal of Supreme
Court decisions on the point indicates only two cases pertinent to this
view, but not expressly in point. In American Banana Company v.
United Fruit Company,14 the plaintiff sued the defendant for threefold
damages resulting from a monoply allegedly created in South America.
Mr. Justice Holmes, in holding that the Sherman Act did not apply,
said,
No doubt in regions subject to no sovereign, like the high seas, or to
no law that civilized countries would recognize as adequate, such coun-
tries may treat some relations between their citizens as governed by their
own law, and keep to some extent, the old notion of personal sovereignty
alive... And the notion that English statutes bind British subjects every-
where has found expression in modern times and has had some startling
applications. .. . But the general and almost universal rule is that the
character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by
the law of the country where the act is done.15
However, in characteristic manner, Mr. Justice Holmes continued by
adding the dictum that acts of Congress will be regarded as territorial
unless the contrary appears. Although this expression is an indica-
tion that the Supreme Court feels certain statutes of Congress may be
given extra-territorial application, and some text writers have so
regarded it,16 it cannot be construed as a holding that Congress may
confer criminal jurisdiction by a statute that would have application
to crimes committed in a foreign country.
In Blackmer v. United States, 7 the defendant, a resident of Paris,
13. WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 113 (Wilson ed. 1936);
see also 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW § 316 (12th ed. 1932); BRIGGS, THE LAW
OF NATIONS 275 (1947).
14. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
15. Id. at 356; cf. United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922).
16. BIGs, THE LAW or NATIONS 275 (1947).
17. 284 U.S. 421 (1932).
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France, was convicted of contempt of court for failure to answer a
subpoena served in Paris, issued by the Supreme Court of the District
of Columbia. The United States Supreme Court, with Chief Justice
Hughes speaking for the majority, held that the District of Columbia
court had jurisdiction over the defendant by virtue of his American
citizenship. This case is readily distinguishable from the problem
under discussion as the situs of the crime was in the District of
Columbia, the place where the dignity and power of the court was
offended, and extradition made jurisdiction over the person easily
obtainable.
To buttress the argument that Congress could pass such a statute,
attention may be directed to the criminal statutes now in existence
that seemingly have extraterritorial application. Treason, piracy, and
certain correspondence with foreign governments in an attempt to
influence foreign policy are made punishable by statute regardless of
where the acts are committed. 18 However, in each of these instances
it is not difficult to lay the situs of the crime within the United States
or on a vessel of the United States. It might also be added that, under
international law, any nation has power to punish a pirate appre-
hended within its territory. 9
In opposition to such a proposed enactment of Congress is the well-
settled and universally adopted principle of criminal law that in order
for a sovereign to punish a crime there must not only be jurisdiction
over the person of the offender but also over the situs of the crime.20
A statute by Congress permitting federal courts to try an offense com-
mitted in Korea, for example, would hardly meet the requirements of
the latter portion of this rule. Also, it appears that such a statute would
directly conflict with the sixth amendment to the Constitution of the
United States which provides that "The accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
District wherein the crime shall have been committed."
Further, it may be assumed by implication, that the United States
Attorney General and his federal prosecutors adhere to the view that
the criminal laws of the United States cannot apply to crimes com-
mitted on foreign soil, or that federal courts do not have jurisdiction
over such offenses. In the widely publicized case of LaBoles and Icardi,
accused of murdering Major Hollohan in Italy during World War II,
the defendants were never brought to trial, and the prosecution was
apparently dismissed. Due to the absence of an extradition treaty with
Italy, the alleged offenders could not be returned abroad for trial,
nor, apparently, could they be tried in the courts of the United States
for a crime committed on Italian soil.
18. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2381 (1951).
19. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909).
20. 14 Am. Jun., Criminal Law § '214 (1936).
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A statute of the nature suggested by the Supreme Court would be
most impractical for the government and most burdensome for those
charged with the prosecution of foreign crimes.
As an example, assume the existence of such a statute at the time
airman-civilian Toth was apprehended. Under such a statute Toth
would be tried in the Western District of Pennsylvania. This, accord-
ing to Mr. Justice Black, will insure that Toth has an opportunity for
the presentation of witnesses equal to that of the prosecution. But is
that true? The military, with its unlimited financial resources could,
and would, order military personnel to fly from Korea to testify, and
arrange for the appearance of indigenous Korean or American civilian
witnesses. The defendant Toth, on the other hand, would be in a most
difficult position unless he has wealth of an unusual proportion. The
cost of one single witness from Seoul, Korea would approximate
$1,500 in travel fees alone,21 and provided the Attorney General has
certified that the witness is essential, this amount must be presented
by the American Consul in Seoul at the time the subpoena is served.22
Testimony cannot be obtained by deposition in the federal criminal
courts, and in addition the subpoena power of federal district courts
through the consular service abroad extends only to American wit-
nesses.
The second possible solution is to place a provision in the enlistment
contracts of that large body of military personnel who voluntarily
enlist in the respective services by which they agree to remain subject
to the Uniform Code of Military Justice until five years after the
termination of their enlistment.
This suggestion has definite legal objections. As mentioned pre-
viously, it is a generally accepted principle that although an offender
may consent to jurisdiction over his person, his consent cannot confer
jurisdiction over the situs of the crime.23 In addition it is doubtful if
such a provision could be extended to the large number of military
personnel whose service is compelled by the Selective Service Act.
The third possible remedy available is for the United States to
execute a status-of-forces treaty with the foreign countries that now
contain United States military personnel, such as the Republic of
Korea, giving them complete authority to punish crimes committed
within their sovereign boundaries. This method would be technically
correct from a legal standpoint, and well founded in precedent. How-
ever, in countries such as Korea, criminal procedure and personal
rights of the accused are not always consistent with those granted by
the Constitution of the United States, nor, frequently, is representation
21. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1821 (Cum. Supp. 1955).
22. Ibid.
23. 14 Am. JUR., Criminal Law § 214 (1936).
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by counsel adequate by American standards.24 In addition, daily news-
paper accounts indicate the growing apprehension of lawmakers to
agreements that subject American citizens to trial in foreign countries,
with foreign languages and foreign procedures. 25
Perhaps this objection could be eliminated by the establishment
of consular courts similar to those already provided by the federal
code.26 Under this plan, the American consul present, by treaty agree-
ment, enforces the criminal laws of the foreign country in accordance
with the procedures established by the statute bringing it into exist-
ence. The obvious defect in this plan is that it in no manner guarantees
those personal constitutional rights that the Court so jealously guarded
in the Toth case. For example, trial by jury in a consular court in a
foreign country would be meaningless, if not impossible.
CONCLUSION
In summary, it would appear that the Supreme Court, through the
Toth decision, has created a situation that bears a potentiality of in-
justice and social detriment completely out of proportion to that feared
from the provisions in the Uniform Code of Military Justice unhesi-
tatingly declared unconstitutional. If the Court had adopted a prac-
tical and realistic approach to the problem, comparing the rights of
the individual under both the constitution and military law, and
visualizing the problem created by its present decision, the result
could have been different. Now, Congress must attempt remedial ac-
tion and determine the method of cure that will result in the minimum
deprivation of personal rights-which is exactly what it did in 1950
when it enacted article 3 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
24. Storey, Korean Law and Lawyers: The New Korean Legal Center, 41
A.B.A.J. 629 (1955).
25. Newsweek, Feb. 20, 1956, p. 33.
26. See 20 STAT. 131 (1878), 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 141-83 (1952).
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